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Do mergers create or destroy value? Evidence from unsuccessful mergers 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The market for corporate control is one of the fundamental mechanisms of corporate 
governance by which firm managers are induced to act in the best interests of widely dispersed 
shareholders. When firm management fails to maximize shareholder value by a sufficiently large 
degree, prospective gains induce outsiders to threaten or actually take steps to replace incumbent 
management.  The actions of these outsiders lead to increased firm value as shareholders revalue 
the firm’s future cash flows under new management or under better stewardship by existing 
management. 
As Denis and McConnell (2003) point out, the market for corporate control has a “dark 
side,” as well.  Managers may engage in takeovers1 to maximize personal utility rather than 
shareholder value.  In many cases, these takeovers are negative net-present-value (NPV) projects 
that decrease, rather than increase, shareholder wealth. 
Do takeovers create or destroy value for would-be acquirers? Theory offers competing 
answers, leading researchers to turn to empirical studies for an answer.  Numerous studies have 
used standard event-study methodology to examine the effects of successful takeovers and come 
up with conflicting evidence.
2
 The purpose of the proposed research is to take a different tack, by 
examining unsuccessful takeover attempts for new evidence on whether mergers create or 
destroy value for acquirers and targets.  
In general, event studies of successful mergers find that targets of takeover attempts 
realize positive and significant excess returns around the announcement dates of the takeovers. 
                                                 
1
 We use the terms “takeover,” “merger” and “acquisition” interchangeably in this proposal. 
2
 See Bruner (2002) for a recent review of this literature.   
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Estimates of the targets’ gains are quite large, ranging from around 10% to 30%.  Evidence on 
the returns to acquirers is quite mixed.  One group of studies finding significantly negative 
returns in the range of -1% to -3%; a second group finding significantly positive returns in the 
range of 1% to 7%; and a third group finds no significant abnormal returns. 
 This inconclusive body of evidence on the returns to acquirers is not surprising. 
Theoretically, mergers create value by creating operating synergies, typically in the form of 
economies of scale or economies of scope.  Economies of scale are most likely to be realized 
when firms engaged in the same line of business combine operations, i.e., in horizontal mergers.  
Economies of scope are most likely to be realized when firms in the same chain of supply 
combine operations, i.e., in vertical mergers.   
When firms in unrelated businesses combine operations, i.e., in conglomerate mergers, 
there is less theoretical reason for value creation.  Many researchers have theorized that financial 
synergies are created in conglomerate mergers.
3
 By reducing the variability of the combined 
firm’s cash flows through diversification, the merger supposedly enables the resulting firm to 
borrow at lower rates than either of the two merging firms, thereby lowering its weighted 
average cost of capital. Another advantage is the tax treatment of income whereby profits 
generate a tax liability but losses do not generate a tax credit (Madj and Meyers 1987).  
Diversified firms can avoid this asymmetry to some degree by pooling gains and losses across 
business segments. 
Agency theory, however, suggests that mergers, in general, and conglomerate mergers, in 
particular, result from principal-agent conflicts between shareholders seeking to maximize their 
                                                 
3
 See, for example, Levy and Sarnat (1970), Lewellen (1971), Lintner (1971), Weston and 
Mansinghka (1971), Melnik and Pollatschek (1973), Williamson (1975), Amihud and Levi 
(1981), Stapleton (1982), and Amihud, Dodd and Weinstein (1986)). 
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wealth and firm managers seeking a larger empire or a less-risky firm (Jensen 1986).  Because 
firm size is a fundamental determinant of executive compensation (Baker, Jensen and Murphy 
1988; Jensen and Murphy 1990), managers have strong incentives to make acquisitions that 
increase firm size, even at the expense of shareholder wealth.  Similarly, firm managers benefit 
from mergers that provide less risky cash flows through diversification, as their job security is 
enhanced when the likelihood of financial distress is reduced. 
 How does this explain the contradictory findings regarding returns to bidders?  The 
synergistic view of mergers suggests that horizontal and vertical mergers create shareholder 
value, but that conglomerate mergers may not.  The agency view of mergers suggests that all 
mergers are likely to destroy value, but that conglomerate mergers and mergers where the 
acquirer has exceptional performance, substantial free-cash flow and unused debt capacity are 
especially suspect.  The synergistic view supports the group of studies finding positive abnormal 
returns for acquirers, whereas the agency view supports the group of studies finding negative 
abnormal returns for acquirers. 
In this study, we contribute to the literature in three important areas.  First, we contribute 
to the literature on signaling by investigating whether a takeover attempt signals investors about 
the quality of firm management as well as the quality of the specific firm investment under 
consideration.  If changes in value around bid announcements are not reversed around 
termination announcements, then these net changes in value provide evidence that mergers signal 
to investors about the quality of management as well as about the value of the proposed 
acquisition.  We find that bid announcement returns are partially, but not completely, reversed by 
termination announcement returns, evidence that the merger proposal itself contains information 
about the value of the bidding firm. 
 4 
Second, we contribute to the literature on the value of diversification by examining how 
merger bids and terminations affect the relative values of bidders attempting diversifying and 
focusing takeovers. Our evidence enables us to differentiate between the synergistic and agency 
views of mergers.  We find significant differences in the responses of firms attempting focusing 
versus diversifying mergers.  The reversal of bid announcement returns by termination 
announcement returns is significantly different for focusing and diversifying firms.  There is no 
reversal for diversifying firms while there is a partial reversal for focusing firms.  This provides 
evidence in support of both the synergistic and agency views of mergers. Synergies are evident 
in focusing mergers while agency costs are evident in diversifying mergers. 
Third, we contribute to the literature on the valuation effects of mergers by using data 
from the 1991-2000 period to re-examine the important topic of who wins and who loses when 
mergers are terminated.  Previous research examining terminated mergers has relied exclusively 
upon data from the 1980s.  Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) provide evidence of 
significant differences in these two waves of mergers, including the decline in the portion of 
hostile takeovers and increased use of stock as the method of payment during the 1990s. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The empirical evidence on conglomerate firms is consistent with agency theory.  More 
specifically, these authors attempt to test the “inefficient investment” hypothesis, which posits 
that diversified firms invest too much in segments that perform poorly and too little in segments 
that perform well.  Lang and Stulz (1994), Comment and Jarrell (1995) , Berger and Ofek 
(1995),  Servaes (1996), Lamont (1997), Shin and Stulz (1998), Rajan, Servaes and Zingales 
(2000) and Lamont and Polk (2002) each find that conglomerate firms sell at a discount relative 
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to firms operating in a single industry and attribute this to agency costs. In general, these firms 
examine the investments of conglomerates by SIC codes and compare those investments with 
industry values of Tobin’s Q measured across single-segment firms. 
Maquieria, Megginson and Nail (1998) analyze wealth changes around stock-for-stock 
mergers announced during 1963-96 period.  They find that bidders in non-conglomerate mergers 
reap significant wealth gains while bidders in conglomerate mergers experience significant 
wealth losses.  Overall, they find evidence that non-conglomerate mergers create real operating 
synergies but that conglomerate mergers do not appear to create financial synergies.  Delong 
(2001) examines bank mergers, classifying them by focus along geography and activity as 
proxied by stock-return clustering.  He find that mergers  of two banks in the same geographic 
region or involved in the same activities increase the bidder’s value by 2% to 3% more than 
other types of bank mergers.
4
 
 A number of studies have examined the accounting performance of firms involved in 
mergers, the two most widely known being Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) and Healy, Palepu 
and Ruback (1992). Ravenscraft and Scherer examine firm profitability by line of business and 
find that targets decline in profitability post-merger.  They conclude from this evidence that 
mergers destroy firm value.  Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) examine the combined industry-
adjusted operating performance of fifty largest mergers occurring during 1979-84 during the 
three years before and after the merger.  They find that industry-adjusted performance increases 
significantly during post-merger period. 
                                                 
4
 Other studies finding evidence that increased focus benefits shareholders include Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Healy, Palepu, and Ruback 
(1992), Lang and Stulz (1994), and Servaes (1996). 
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 In general, the above cited studies examine successful takeovers. In practice, there also 
have been a number of takeover attempts that failed.  To fully understand how mergers affect 
firm value, it is insightful to examine evidence from these failed takeover attempts.  
In this study, we provide such an analysis.  We have identified 220 pairs of firms that 
were involved in failed takeover attempts during the period 1992-2001, and classified each 
merger as diversifying (conglomerate) or focusing (horizontal or vertical) based upon the firms’ 
two-digit standard industrial classification SIC code. We then use standard event-study 
methodology to estimate the excess returns around the announcements of both the takeover bid 
and the subsequent termination of the takeover bid.  By comparing the excess returns around the 
announcements of the merger bids to those around the announcement of the merger terminations, 
we provide new evidence regarding signaling theory, i.e., whether mergers attempts signal the 
quality of firm management as well as the quality of firm investment.  By comparing the excess 
returns to focusing versus diversifying mergers, we are able provide new evidence on the 
synergistic versus agency views of mergers.   
There are a number of studies that have examined failed takeovers, but most of these are 
now quite dated and analyze takeover attempts that occurred during the merger wave of the 
1980s. Around the announcements of merger terminated during the 1970s, Dodd (1980) finds 
negative excess returns for bidding firms but positive excess returns for target firms, if the target 
firm initiates the termination. Both Dodd and Ruback (1977) and Bradley (1980) examine tender 
offers and find that the value of target firms remain above pre-offer levels after the offers are 
cancelled. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) find negative excess returns for bidding firms around 
the announcements of failed tender offers during the 1970s.   
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Davidson, Dutia and Cheng (1989) examine 163 failed mergers during the 1976-86 
period.  They find results similar to Dodd (1980); negative excess returns for bidders and 
positive excess returns for targets initiating the terminations. Denis and Serrano (1996) analyze 
unsuccessful takeovers during the 1983-89 period and find high management turnover following 
termination of the takeover attempt.  
Chang and Suk (1998) examine 279 failed mergers from 1982-90; around merger 
terminations, they find positive excess returns for bidders offering stock and negative excess 
returns for bidders offering cash, each significant at the .10 level.  They also find that excess 
returns are positive when the bidder initiates the termination and insignificant when the target 
initiates the termination. 
Safiedeine and Titman (1999) examine a sample of 573 targets of unsuccessful takeovers 
that occurred during the 1982-1991 period, and find that targets terminating attempted takeovers 
suffer negative excess returns of 5.14% around the announcement date of the termination.   
Although most of these studies document that bidding firms suffer negative excess return 
at the time of the merger termination, none of these studies can explain under what 
circumstances bidding firms are expected to have negative returns. 
 
3. Data 
 To conduct this study, we collected four different types of data: daily stock return data, 
annual data identifying firms by industry, annual performance data on firm performance and 
condition and data on the dates when mergers and merger terminations were announced in the 
financial press.  We obtained daily stock-return data from CRSP and annual accounting data as 
well as data on standard industry classification (SIC) codes from Compustat.  To identify the 
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dates on which mergers and merger terminations were announced, we searched Mergerstat 
Review, the Wall Street Journal Index and the Lexis-Nexis database. From these three sources, 
we identified a total of 220 merger terminations during the period from January 1991 through 
December 2000.  To be included in our sample, both the acquirer and target had to be publicly 
traded and have data available from both Compustat and CRSP. 
 Table 1 reports the distribution of our sample by year, type of merger and form of 
payment, while Table 2 reports sample composition and descriptive statistics. The majority of 
firms are involved in horizontal mergers (127 of 220). Almost half proposed using stock to 
finance their acquisitions (102 of 220). There are only 35 proposed conglomerate mergers and 
only 52 proposed cash transactions.  The mean and median times between the bid and 
termination announcements (not shown in Table 1) were 73 and 53 days, respectively, with a 
range of 1 to 322 days.  Of the 220 merger terminations, 34 were terminated by the target, 56 by 
the bidder, 40 by a successful bid by a third party and 90 for unknown reasons. 
 
4. Methodology and Hypotheses 
 First, we form portfolios of mergers classified as horizontal, vertical and conglomerate in 
nature.  To do this, we follow Berger and Ofek (1995), Mann and Sicherman (1991), Sicherman 
and Pettway (1987) and Smith (1990) in using the two-digit SIC code of the two firms involved 
to classify each proposed merger. If both firms have the same two-digit SIC code, then we 
classify the attempt as horizontal; if both firms have the same one-digit, but not two-digit SIC 
codes, then we classify the attempt as vertical; and if each firm has a different one-digit SIC 
code, we classify the attempt as conglomerate. We double-checked the classification of vertical 
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and conglomerate mergers by examining the short description of each firm’s business from 10K 
Reports and Annual Reports.   
Second, we use standard event-study methodology to calculate portfolio excess returns 
for our full sample and for the horizontal, vertical and conglomerate sub-samples. We use the 
market-adjusted return model to calculate abnormal returns: 
AR i,t = R i,t – R M,t        (1) 
where: 
AR i,t is the abnormal return for portfolio i on day t, 
R i,t is the return for portfolio i on day t, and  
R M,t is the market return for the equal-weighted CRSP index on day t. 
We choose to employ the market-adjusted model rather than the market model because of the 
large expected changes in betas for firms involved in takeovers.  As a robustness test, we also 
estimate returns using the standard market model: 
AR i,t = R i,t – (0 + 1 R M,t )      (2) 
where AR i,t , R i,t , and R M,t are as defined above and the intercept and slope coefficients 0 
and 1 are estimated by ordinary-least-squares regression over the period from 300 to 50 trading 
days before the merger announcement. 
We calculate portfolio cumulative abnormal returns CAR i by summing the portfolio 
abnormal returns AR i over the three-day event window –1, 0, 1.5 We will calculate portfolio 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for our entire samples of bidders and targets, and then form 
separate portfolios of bidders and targets based upon our classifications of mergers as horizontal, 
vertical or conglomerate. We can then test for significant differences in these portfolio CARs.  
                                                 
5
 For robustness, we also will investigate other event windows. 
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According to the synergies hypothesis, we expect to find positive CARs around the bid 
announcements as shareholders revalue the firm in light of a positive NPV investment; and 
negative CARs of equal magnitude around the termination announcements as shareholders 
revalue the firm in light of the loss of that positive NPV investment.  In addition, we expect the 
CARs for conglomerate mergers to be smaller than those for non-conglomerate mergers, as 
financial synergies are expected to be much smaller than real operating synergies, yielding lower 
NPVs.   
According to the agency hypothesis, we expect to find negative CARs around the bid 
announcements as shareholders revalue the firm in light of a negative NPV investment; and 
positive CARs of equal magnitude around the termination announcements as shareholders 
revalue the firm in light of the cancellation of that negative NPV investment.  The agency 
hypothesis makes no predictions regarding the relative magnitudes of gains/losses of 
conglomerate versus non-conglomerate firms. 
According to the signaling hypothesis, we have no expectations regarding the direction of 
CARs around the bid announcements, but expect that the CAR reversal around the termination 
announcement will be significantly smaller in magnitude.  This is because managers making 
positive but unsuccessful NPV bids will be expected to make future positive NPV bids, while 
managers making negative but unsuccessful NPV bids will be expected to make future negative 
NPV bids.  These expectations lead to a permanent revaluation of the firm beyond the value of 
the investment project involved in the current bid. 
Third, we use eq. (1) and eq. (2) to estimate abnormal returns for each firm in our sample. 
From these daily abnormal returns, we calculate firm CARs and then will estimate a series of 
cross-sectional regression model of the form: 
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CAR i = 0 + 1 * Horizontal i + 2 * Vertical i +  ∑ N *Control Variables +  i  (3)                                               
where: 
CAR i is the cumulative abnormal return around the announcement date for firm i,  
Horizontal i is a dummy variable indicating horizontal takeover attempts, 
Vertical i is a dummy variable indicating vertical takeover attempts,  
Control Variables i are a series of control variables described below, 
 N,  N = 0 to K are parameter estimates, and  
 i  is a normally distributed error term. 
Based upon the findings of previous research, our proposed control variables include the 
absolute size of the target, the relative size of the target to the bidder, the type of payment (cash 
vs. stock vs. combo), and which party terminated the proposed merger (bidder, target, other 
acquirer, or unknown).  
If the synergies hypothesis is correct, then we expect to find positive and significant 
coefficients for the intercept, as well as for the dummy variables Horizontal and Vertical.   If the 
agency hypothesis is correct, we expect to find a negative and significant coefficient for the 
intercept and insignificant coefficients for the dummy variables Horizontal and Vertical. 
 Fourth, we estimate cross-sectional regressions of the form: 
CAR-TERM i  =  0  +  1  *  CAR-BID i   +    i                                                           (4) 
where: 
CAR-TERM i is the cumulative abnormal return around the merger termination 
announcement date for firm i,  
CAR-BID i is the cumulative abnormal return around the merger announcement date for   
firm i. 
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 n,  N = 0 to 1 are parameter estimates for the intercept and slope, and  
 i  is a normally distributed error term. 
If the synergies hypothesis is correct, we expect to find an insignificant intercept and a 
coefficient of minus one for CAR-BID, as the bid announcement gains are completely reversed at 
termination.  If the agency hypothesis is correct, we expect to find an insignificant intercept and 
a coefficient of plus one for CAR-BID, as the bid announcement losses are completely reversed 
at termination.  If the signaling hypothesis is correct, then we expect the coefficient of CAR-BID 
to be significantly different from one, as shareholders permanently revalue the firm’s 
management team by failing to completely reverse the bid announcement gain at termination. 
 
5. Results 
 Table 3 presents results from estimating cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using eq. 
(2).  Panel A presents results for the full sample.  On average, bidders suffered a negative and 
statistically significant cumulative abnormal return of 211 basis points during the three-day event 
window around announcement of the merger bid, but earned back a positive and statistically 
significant cumulative abnormal return of 81 basis points during the three-day event window 
around announcement of the merger termination. The average combined return during the two 
event windows is a statistically significant negative 130 basis points. 
 Panels B, C and D present results by type of merger, type of payment, and terminating 
party, respectively.  During the bid window, firms engaged in both focusing and diversifying 
mergers realized negative CARs, but firms announcing horizontal mergers recorded negative 
CARs that were twice the magnitude of those for vertical or conglomerate mergers. During the 
termination window, firms engaged in focusing mergers (horizontal and vertical) realized 
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positive and marginally significant cumulative abnormal returns while firms engaged in 
diversifying mergers realized negative but insignificant cumulative abnormal returns.   
During the bid window, firms proposing stock transactions realized statistically 
significant and negative CARs of 424 basis points while firms proposing cash transactions 
earned positive but statistically insignificant CARs and firms proposing combo transactions 
earned negative but statistically insignificant CARs.  During the termination window, firms 
proposing cash transactions realized statistically significant and positive CARs of 232 basis 
points; returns for non-cash transactions were positive but not significantly different from zero.  
During the bid window, firms that terminated their own proposals realized statistically 
significant and negative CARs of 356 basis points, while firms whose targets terminated their 
proposals realized negative and significant CARs of 221 basis points.  Firms that lost out to 
another successful bidder realized negative and significant CARS of 199 basis points. All other 
firms recorded negative and significant CARs of 135 basis points.  During the termination 
window, firms that terminated their own proposals earned positive and statistically significant 
CARs of 308 basis points, while bidders that lost out to another successful bidder earned positive 
and statistically significant CARs of 242 basis points.  Firms whose targets terminated their bids 
realized positive but insignificant CARs, and “other” firms earned CARs that were negative but 
insignificant. When CARs for the two event windows are summed together, only firms that lost 
out to another bidder ended up with net positive returns. 
In general, the results in Table 3 are inconsistent with the synergies hypothesis, which 
predicts positive CARs during the bid-announcement window, but supportive of the agency 
hypothesis, which predicts negative CARs during the bid-announcement window. During the bid 
window, each portfolio of firms analyzed realized negative CARs except for those proposing 
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cash transactions, which earned positive but insignificant CARs. For many portfolios, the 
negative CARs are statistically significant.  In general, we do observe positive CARs during the 
termination-announcement window, but the coefficients are much smaller in magnitude than in 
the bid window, which is inconsistent with the agency hypothesis.  These results, are supportive 
of the signaling hypothesis, which predicts that the reversals during the termination window will 
be much smaller in magnitude than the declines in the bid window. 
 Table 4 presents results from estimating eq. (4), which tests for reversal of the bid 
announcement returns during the time of the termination announcements.  These results enable 
us to test the signaling hypothesis: whether or not the merger proposal itself affects the value of 
the firm by signaling investors about the quality of management.  If the estimated coefficients are 
significantly greater than -1.0, then our evidence supports the signaling hypothesis.  For the full 
sample, the coefficient on CAR-Bid is -0.19, which is significantly higher than -1.0 and is 
significantly different from zero at the 0.06 significance level.   When we examine the results by 
type of merger, we see that these results are driven by statistically significant results for focusing 
mergers in general and horizontal mergers in particular.  For horizontal mergers, about one-
fourth of the bid announcement return is reversed at the time of termination. For diversifying 
mergers, there is no evidence of reversal; in fact, the coefficient on CAR-Bid is positive, but not 
significantly different from zero. 
Overall, these results are broadly supportive of the signaling hypothesis, in that the 
changes in value realized during the bid announcement window are only partially reversed 
during the time around the merger termination announcement.  The results also are supportive of 
the synergies hypothesis, in that we find significantly different results for focusing and 
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diversifying mergers.  The decline in firm value associated with a focusing merger is 
significantly smaller than that associated with a diversifying merger. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
Our results provide new evidence on the valuation effects of mergers. We contribute to 
the literature in at least three important areas.  First and most important, we will contribute to the 
literature on signaling by investigating whether a takeover attempt signals investors about the 
quality of firm management as well as the quality of the specific firm investment under 
consideration.  We find strong and persuasive evidence that the merger proposal itself, as well as 
the proposed transaction, affects the value of the firm.  Our results show that the value of the 
bidding firm is permanently reduced by the proposal, even when the proposed transaction is not 
consummated.  We interpret this as evidence that firm management has revealed its propensity 
for undertaking negative NPV projects, and that the market punishes management by lowering 
its valuation of the firm. 
Second, we contribute to the literature on the value of diversification by examining how 
merger bids and terminations affect the relative values of bidders attempting diversifying and 
focusing takeovers. Contrary to the synergies hypothesis, we find that firms proposing horizontal 
mergers realize the greatest negative cumulative abnormal returns and do not recover when the 
bids are terminated.  
Third, we contribute to the literature on the valuation effects of mergers by using data 
covering the period from the 1991-2000 to re-examine the important topic of who wins and who 
loses when mergers are terminated.  Previous research in this area has exclusively relied upon 
data from the 1980s.   
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The results of this research are not only important for academic professionals but also 
have broad implications for corporate managers and other stakeholders, government regulators, 
and especially investors who rely upon the market for corporate control to discipline managers.  
Managers and stockholders of both the target and bidding firms want to know how mergers 
affect the values of their firms.  Employees and labor unions are interested in the wealth 
redistribution effect of the mergers.  Government regulators want to know whether mergers 
concentrate power and lessen competition.  Investors, merger arbitrageurs, and portfolio 
managers can use the results of this research to make better investment decisions, including 
disciplining managers through the market for corporate control. 
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Table 1 
Annual Distribution of 220 Announcements of Terminated Mergers from 1991-2000 
 
Panel A: By Type of Merger 
 
 Year  Horizontal Vertical Conglomerate  All 
        
 1991  8 2 0  10 
 1992  5 2 1  8 
 1993  8 0 0  8 
 1994  17 8 5  30 
 1995  14 5 2  21 
 1996  16 4 6  26 
 1997  12 9 6  27 
 1998  13 13 7  33 
 1999  22 13 4  39 
 2000  12 2 4  18 
        
 Total  127 58 35  220 
 
Panel B: By Method of Payment 
 
 Year  Stock Cash Combo  All 
        
 1991  4 2 4  10 
 1992  3 0 5  8 
 1993  4 1 3  8 
 1994  12 10 8  30 
 1995  8 5 8  21 
 1996  12 2 12  26 
 1997  9 9 9  27 
 1998  19 9 5  33 
 1999  20 9 10  39 
 2000  11 5 2  18 
        
 Total  102 52 66  220 
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Table 2: 
Sample Distribution and Descriptive Statistics  
for 220 Terminated Mergers from 1991-2000 
 
  N. Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Error 
     
 Value 220 1.594 0.367 
 Relative Size 220 0.798 0.16 
     
 Payment:    
   Cash 52 0.24  
   Combo 66 0.30  
   Stock 102 0.46  
  N. Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Error 
 Type:    
   Horizontal 127 0.58  
   Vertical 58 0.26  
   Conglomerate 35 0.16  
 Terminated:     
   By Target 34 0.15  
   By Bidder 56 0.25  
   By 3rd 40 0.18  
   By Other 90 0.41  
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Table 3: 
Three-Day Cumulative Abnormal Returns for 220 Bidding Firms  
Around the Announcement of Merger Terminations from 1991-2000 
 
 
    Bid   Termination  
 N. Obs. CAR(-1, 1) T-Stat  CAR(-1, 1) T-Stat  
Panel A: Full Sample        
  All   220 -2.107 -4.63 *** 0.811 2.19 ** 
          
Panel B: By Method of Payment       
  Cash   52 0.502 0.41  2.315 2.62 *** 
  Combo   66 -0.875 -1.15  0.120 0.57  
  Stock   102 -4.235 -5.89  0.492 1.47  
    Bid   Termination   
   N. Obs. CAR(-1, 1) T-Stat  CAR(-1, 1) T-Stat  
Panel C: By Terminating Party       
    
Bidder   56 -3.555 -3.07 *** 3.082 2.05 ** 
  Target   34 -2.208 -2.26 ** 0.502 0.48  
  Third   40 -1.986 -1.81 * 2.417 3.29 *** 
  Other   90 -1.347 -2.20 ** -1.198 0.14  
          
Panel D: By Type of Merger       
  Horizontal  127 -2.616 -5.05 *** 0.577 1.63  
  Vertical  58 -1.495 -1.63  2.174 1.71 * 
  Conglomerate  35 -1.277 -0.58  -0.597 0.17  
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Table 4: 
Reversal of Bid Announcement Returns by Termination Announcement Returns 
Results from estimating the cumulative abnormal returns during the three-day event window 
around the announcement of a merger termination as a function of the cumulative abnormal 
returns during the three-day event window around the announcement of a merger bid. 
 
 Coefficient T-Statistic  Adjusted R2  
Panel A: All Firms      
  All firms -0.196 -1.91 * 0.012  
Panel B: By Type of Merger     
  Horizontal -0.268 -1.99 ** 0.023 ** 
  Vertical -.256 -1.09  0.003  
  Conglomerate 0.163 0.80  -0.011  
  Non-Conglomerate -0.260 -2.25 ** 0.0215 ** 
 
